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Call statements expressed by substitution instances of  
(TC) y is a necessary condition for the possibility of x  
‘transcendental conditionals’.1 According to what is perhaps the standard account of 
transcendental conditionals, any given instance of (TC) is interpretable in terms of an ‘if-then’-
sentence whose antecedent expresses a proposition to the effect that some x is possible and 
whose consequent expresses a statement to the effect that some y is actual.2 Despite its wide 
acceptance, this standard reading of transcendental conditionals is problematic. The first goal of 
this chapter is to bring out why it is problematic and to suggest an alternative reading. Section 2 
develops the alternative and sets out how it affects the inferential structure of transcendental 
arguments (henceforth, TAs). The second goal of this chapter is to argue that the much discussed 
distinction between ambitious and modest TAs, which has been developed and deployed by 
various authors in the wake of Stroud’s influential critique of transcendental reasoning (Stroud 
1968), may be pointless when applied to TAs from performative inconsistency that have moral 
statements as their conclusions. In what follows, I call TAs that have moral statements as their 
conclusions ‘moral TAs’. Section 3 rehearses the distinction between ambitiousness and modesty, 
sketches an account of performative inconsistency and provides some justification for the 
following claim: If moral truth is assertorically constrained, then any modest moral TA from 
performative inconsistency is convertible into an ambitious moral TA from performative 
inconsistency. The concluding section 4 raises some open questions. 
A caveat is in order. It may already be clear from my initial remarks that the discussion in section 
3 will rely on a series of substantial metaethical assumptions. Jointly, these assumptions amount 
to a kind of (non-error-theoretic) moral cognitivism: Moral statements can be the conclusions of 
arguments; they are truth-apt; some of them are true; they can work together with non-moral 
truth-apt statements as premises in arguments (mixed inferences) and can occur as components 
of truth-apt logically complex (compound) statements whose other components, in their turn, 
may or may not be moral statements; they can be asserted (claimed to be true) and can be the 
contents of beliefs, which in their turn can be epistemically justified and criticised, i.e. , rationally 
assessed with regard to the question of whether their propositional contents are true. Even 
though these assumptions may, arguably, lay good claim to expressing – in somewhat technical 
terms – important aspects of our performative self-understanding as participants in 
argumentative debates on moral questions, each of them can be, or has been, contested in the 
metaethical literature. Presumably, however, a philosopher who denies even just one of them will 
have little patience with moral TAs.3 She will reject the philosophical project of devising TAs to 
                                                                 
1 The term ‘transcendental conditional’ is borrowed from Illies  (2003, p. 31 and pp. 35-40). Stern (2000, p. 6-11 
passim) uses ‘transcendental claim’ to refer to the relevant conditional statements.  Admissible substituents for ‘x’ and 
‘y’ in (TC) will be specified in section 2. 
2 I use ‘proposition’ and ‘statement’ interchangeably. For ease of expression, I also use ‘<...>’ as shorthand for ‘the 
proposition that...’. For instance, ‘<humanity is valuable>’ is to be read as ‘the proposition that humanity is valuable’, 
and ‘<p>’ is to be read as ‘the proposition/statement that p’; ‘p’ takes declarative sentences as substituents. 
3 Unless, that is, she assigns a kind of semantic value to moral statements that is different from truth but still allows 
for the collaboration of moral and non-moral (or more generally: normative and non-normative) statements as 
premises in arguments and as components of ‘mixed’ compound statements. This is what  Habermas (1990, p. 56) 
seems to suggest when he d istinguishes between “normative rightness” and “propositional truth” as the two 
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moral conclusions – not because she will find particular fault with that kind of argument to that 
kind of conclusion but for the sweeping reason that, on her count, there are no sound arguments 
to moral conclusions to be had, be they transcendental or not. I submit, then, that each of the 
metaethical assumptions listed above is indispensable if a constructive and sustained discussion 
of moral transcendental arguments is so much as to get off the ground. Since my purpose in this 
chapter is to engage in precisely this kind of discussion, I assume for the sake of argument that 
the moral cognitivism outlined above is roughly correct.  
 
2. Transcendental conditionals and transcendental arguments 
It is sometimes said that what distinguishes TAs from other kinds of argument is that they either 
involve at least one transcendental conditional – i.e., at least one statement expressible by an 
instance of (TC) – among their premises or have a transcendental conditional as their conclusion 
(Stern 2000, pp. 6-7).4 I take the disjunction to be inclusive since there is no obstacle to 
constructing arguments that have a transcendental conditional as their conclusion and involve 
transcendental conditionals among their premises. The relation expressed by ‘...is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of__’ is usually, and plausibly, assumed to be transitive. If y is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of x, and z is a necessary condition for the possibility of y, 
it follows that z is a necessary condition for the possibility of x. Transitivity enables the 
construction of TAs from transcendental conditionals to conclusions that are themselves 
transcendental conditionals.5 By contrast, given at least two transcendental conditionals that are 
inferentially connected via transitivity and a premise to the effect that the antecedent of the 
conditional initiating the transitive chain is true, one can proceed by repeated applications of 
Modus ponens and detach, in the final step, the consequent of the last member of the chain.6 The 
latter is just a generalisation of the simple case in which we have one transcendental conditional, a 
premise to the effect that its antecedent is true, and a detachment of the conditional’s 
consequent. In these regards, TAs exploit logical properties that are not at all peculiar to 
transcendental conditionals. 
From what I have said so far, it is clear that ‘involving a transcendental conditional’ can at most 
be claimed to be a necessary condition of an argument’s being a TA. An argument may have a 
transcendental conditional as one of its premises and fail to be a TA. Here is an example: Self-
consciousness is a necessary condition for the possibility of agency. Whales are mammals. 
Therefore, self-consciousness is a necessary condition for the possibility of agency and whales are 
mammals. An argument may also have a transcendental conditional as its conclusion and fail to 
be a TA: Self-consciousness is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience or whales 
                                                                                                                                                                              
dimensions of “validity” of prescriptive (more generally, normative) and descriptive statements, respectively. I think 
that this move creates more problems than it solves but cannot discuss the relevant issues here. 
4 Franks (2005, p. 204, cf. also p. 209) seems to hold that only arguments whose conclusions are transcendental 
conditionals deserve the title ‘TA’ (emphasis in the orig.): “[A]nything that might helpfully be called a transcendental 
argument should issue in some conditional to the effect that some conditioned would be impossible, if not for some 
condition.” I find this point plausible insofar as it seems clear that the hard work regards arguing for transcendental 
conditionals rather than their use as premises in arguments. 
5 Arguments of this sort would have to play a central role in pursuing the philosophical agenda envisaged by Stroud 
when he admits that by means of transcendental reasoning “we can come to see how our thinking in certain ways 
necessarily requires that we also think in certain other ways, and so perhaps in certain further ways as well” (Stroud 
1994, p. 234). 
6 Korsgaard’s TA for the value of humanity, for instance, clearly employs the transitivity assumption in this way 
(Korsgaard 1996, cf. Stern 2011, p. 90). 
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are fish. Whales are not fish. Therefore, self-consciousness is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of experience.7 Involvement of at least one transcendental conditional distinguishes 
TAs from some, but not from all non-transcendental arguments. Let us say, then, that an 
argument A is a TA only if the following inclusive disjunction is true: At least one of A’s premises 
is – can reasonably be taken to entail – a transcendental conditional or A’s conclusion is – can 
reasonably be taken to entail – a transcendental conditional. 
To give substance to the idea that TAs differ from non-TAs in that they involve transcendental 
conditionals, restrictions will have to be imposed on what is to count as the right kind of 
inferential involvement. In addition, more will have to be said about what distinguishes 
transcendental from non-transcendental conditionals.  
A useful way to start the discussion is to ask the following question: What, if anything, is the 
difference between y’s being a necessary condition for the possibility of x and y’s being a 
necessary condition of x?8 There are several suggestions in the literature as to what distinguishes 
transcendental conditionals from more familiar necessary-condition statements, such as ‘handing 
in a paper is a necessary condition for passing the exam’. For the most part, these suggestions 
concern the subject matter of – and/or our epistemic position with regard to – the antecedent x 
of candidate transcendental conditionals. For instance, some philosophers follow Kant in saying 
that a given necessary-condition statement is a transcendental conditional only if it is to the effect 
that some y is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience. Others are more permissive 
and say that the possibility of experience is but one promising starting point of transcendental 
reasoning among others. What is important, according to these philosophers, is rather that for a 
proposed transcendental conditional to be plausible and philosophically useful, x has to be such 
that its being actual – a fortiori its being possible – cannot be rationally denied. Now, the thought 
goes, a good way to start searching for something that we cannot rationally deny is reflecting on 
what we presuppose as true in the very attempt to deny (assert the contradictory of) any 
proposition whatsoever. This latter thought – I will return to it in the next section – underlies the 
idea of TAs from performative inconsistency. 
With the aim of complementing, rather than supplanting, these, and similar, approaches at 
characterising transcendental conditionals by imposing epistemological, dialectical, and topical 
restrictions on x, I here want to draw attention to two more formal points about (TC) and, 
accordingly, about its instances. First, (TC) can be read in two different ways: 
(i) y [is a necessary condition for] the possibility of x. 
(ii) y [is a necessary condition for the possibility of] x. 
The square brackets are intended to indicate the following points. In (i), what y is said to be a 
necessary condition for, is the possibility of x. This reading of (TC) suggests that transcendental 
conditionals employ the same notion of necessary condition-hood that is employed in more 
familiar necessary-condition statements. If anything, it would then have to be the modal status of 
x – its being hypothesised as a possibility rather than as an actuality – that distinguishes 
transcendental conditionals from more familiar kinds of necessary-condition statement. Reading 
(ii), by contrast, takes the three-word string ‘the possibility of’ to be part of the expression that is 
used to refer to the relation which is stated to hold between x and y. This suggests the thought 
                                                                 
7 Here and in what follows I use various examples of transcendental conditionals. I do not claim any of the example 
conditionals to be true. 
8 My thanks to Sorin Baiasu for having raised this question in conversation. 
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that transcendental conditionals employ a notion of necessary condition-hood that is distinct 
from and, presumably, intended to be stronger than the one employed in more familiar 
necessary-condition statements. Let us refer to the envisaged notion by ‘necessary* condition’. In 
(ii), then, what y is said to be a necessary* condition for, is x, rather than the possibility of x. I will 
come back to readings (i) and (ii) shortly. 
The second point to notice concerning (TC) is that, grammatically, ‘x’ and ‘y’ occupy positions 
which require substitution by expressions that can function as nouns (compare ‘freedom of will is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of moral responsibility’, ‘having free will is a necessary condition 
for the possibility of being a moral agent’). Replacing ‘x’ and ‘y’ with declarative sentences yields 
results that are not grammatically well-formed. This is an obstacle to interpreting transcendental 
conditionals straightforwardly in terms of ‘if-then’-statements. The latter, however, is desirable in 
that it would allow us to conspicuously represent the inferential roles, as premises and 
conclusions in arguments, that such conditionals are usually taken to be able to play. The obstacle 
to using instances of (TC) as premises in arguments can be brought out by considering the 
following widely used schematic representation of a TA: 
(TAschematic) 
1 (1) x  premise 
2 (2) y is a necessary condition for the possibility of x premise (transcendental 
conditional) 
1, 2 (3) y (1), (2), ? 
 
At line (1) we have to take ‘x’ as occupying sentence position – otherwise we could not think of 
line (1) as a schematic premise. At line (2), however, both ‘x’ and ‘y’ occupy noun position. In the 
conclusion (3), in turn, ‘y’ occupies sentence position. Syntactically, then, premises (1) and (2) do 
not connect in a way that makes them yield the conclusion (3).  
The obstacle can be overcome by means of truth-talk, more precisely, by means of talk about the 
truth of propositions. For what follows, I restrict the range of admissible substituents for ‘x’ and 
‘y’ in (TC) to one particular kind of noun-phrase, namely to instances of ‘the truth of the 
proposition that...’.9 This gives us the following schema of transcendental conditionals:   
(TC1) The truth of the proposition that q is a necessary condition for the possibility of the 
truth of the proposition that p. 
(TC1) is bulky. However, it has the advantage that its schematic letters are in declarative-sentence 
positions – even if these positions are still embedded within noun constructions. Consider an 
instance of (TC1): 
(Instance) The truth of the proposition that we have free will is a necessary condition for 
the possibility of the truth of the proposition that we are agents. 
                                                                 
9 Against this move it might be objected that it illegitimately forces transcendental conditionals into a semantic mold, 
excluding by fiat that the point of a transcendental conditional may very well be ontological or metaphysical, rather 
than semantic. This worry is unfounded, however. The truth-talk employed here can be read as merely serving what 
Quine calls “semantic ascent”. Ignoring Quine’s misgivings about propositions, the following well -known sentence 
from “Philosophy of Logic” – with un-Quinean insertions in square brackets – makes the relevant point: “Here the 
truth predicate serves, as it were, to point through the sentence [proposition] to the reality; it serves as a reminder 
that though sentences [propositions] are mentioned, reality is still the whole point” (Quine 1986, p. 11).  
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One begins to see how an interpretation in terms of an ‘if-then’ statement might be achieved. 
The truth of the proposition that we have free will is a necessary condition for the possibility of x 
iff what is the case if that proposition is true is a necessary condition for the possibility of x. 
What is the case if the proposition that we have free will is true is that we have free will. We can 
therefore take the statement that we have free will as the consequent of the ‘if-then’ statement 
that we are looking for. What about the antecedent? To answer this question I have to revert to 
the distinction between reading (i) and reading (ii) of (TC) outlined above.  
According to reading (i), (Instance) is to be read as: 
The truth of the proposition that we have free will [is a necessary condition for] the 
possibility of the truth of the proposition that we are agents. 
This suggests an interpretation (Instance) in terms of the following ‘if-then’ statement: 
(Instancei) If it is possible that we are agents, then we have free will. 
Generalising from (Instancei), we obtain this schematic ‘if-then’ statement as a reading of (TC): 
(TC2) If it is possible that p, then q.  
(TAschematic) would then seem to be construable in terms of the following argument schema, in 
which ‘p’ and ‘q’ occupy sentence positions throughout: 
(TAschematic
i) 
1 (1) p premise 
2 (2) If it is possible that p, then q premise (transcendental conditional 
according to reading (i)) 
3 (3) If p, then it is possible that p premise (modal principle) 
1, 3 (4) It is possible that p (1), (3), Modus ponens 
1, 2, 3 (5) q (2), (4), Modus ponens 
 
Many authors writing on TAs seem to interpret transcendental conditionals along the lines of 
(TC2), and TAs along the lines of (TAschematic
i) (see, for instance, Pihlström 2004, pp. 291-292, 
Giladi 2016, p. 213, fn. 2). However, there is a problem with (TC2) and its instances. 
Consequently, there is a problem with the schematic premise at line (2) of (TAschematic
i). The 
problem is, quite simply, that regardless of whether we read the modal expression ‘it is possible 
that’ in the antecedent of (TC2) in terms of logical, logico-conceptual, or metaphysical possibility, 
instances of (TC2) would seem to be uniformly false. Arguably, logical, logico-conceptual and 
metaphysical possibility are the best candidates for interpreting the modality involved in the 
antecedents of transcendental conditionals. So this is bad news for (TC2). Recall  
(Instancei) If it is possible that we are agents, then we have free will.  
According to a standard construal of logical possibility, it is logically possible that we are agents 
iff the statement that we are agents does not entail a contradiction, i.e., iff that statement is 
logically consistent. But the actual truth of <we have free will> is clearly not a necessary 
condition for the logical consistency of <we are agents>. What can maybe be said is that the 
logical possibility of the truth of <we have free will> is a necessary condition for the logical 
possibility of the truth of <we are agents>. That, however, is not the thesis expressed by 
(Instancei). What can, perhaps, also be said is that the actual truth of <we have free will> is a 
necessary condition for the actual truth of <we are agents>. But again, this thesis is different 
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from the one expressed by (Instance i). On the logical-possibility reading, therefore, (Instancei) 
seems to be false. 
It is logico-conceptually possible (lc-possibible) that we are agents iff <we are agents> is logically 
consistent and there is no conceptual truth t such that <we are agents & t> is logically 
inconsistent. But the actual truth of <we have free will> is clearly not a necessary condition for 
the lc-possibility of the truth of <we are agents>. What can maybe be said is that the lc-
possibility of the truth of <we have free will> is a necessary condition for its being lc -possible 
that we are agents. Moreover, it is not implausible to claim that the actual truth of <we have free 
will> is a necessary condition for the actual truth of <we are agents>. But these theses are  both 
different from the one stated by (Instance i). On the logico-conceptual-possibility reading, 
therefore, (Instancei) seems to be false too. 
Finally, consider metaphysical possibility. The reasoning is analogous. It is metaphysically 
possible that we are agents iff it is not excluded by every way things might have been that we are 
agents. But our actually having free will is not a necessary condition for there being a way things 
might have been that does not exclude our being agents. What can here be said, at most, is that the 
metaphysical possibility of our having free will is a necessary condition for the metaphysical 
possibility of our being agents. Perhaps it is also correct to say that our actually having free will is 
a necessary condition for the actual truth of the statement that we are agents. But again, these 
plausible theses are both different from the one expressed by (Instance i). On the metaphysical-
possibility reading, therefore, (Instance i) seems to be false too.  
Analogous lines of reasoning can be formulated with regard to any instance of (TC2). The 
problem is structural. It is quite generally not a good idea to claim that the truth of a nonmodal 
statement is a necessary condition for the truth of some logical, logico-conceptual or 
metaphysical possibility statement. These considerations would have to be made more precise. 
But even in their present form they provide strong reasons for the claim that it is a mistake to 
read (TC) along the lines of (i) and (TC2). The mistake is explainable by the surface grammar and 
the wording of (TC), which suggests (TC2) as the apparently most straightforward interpretation 
of (TC). Of course, it might be objected that the preceding considerations have no weight against 
(TC2) since the intended modality in the antecedents of transcendental conditionals is neither 
logical nor logico-conceptual or metaphysical. However, this objection would have to be backed 
up by an account of what the intended sense of ‘it is possible that...’ in the antecedents of 
transcendental conditionals is then supposed to be – and such an account does not seem to be 
forthcoming. 
The rationale for using a transcendental conditional instead of a regular necessary-condition 
statement as a premise in an argument would seem to be the thought that transcendental 
conditionals are logically stronger than regular necessary-condition statements. (TC2) takes its 
lead from the wording and the grammar of (TC) and construes the envisaged additional strength 
of ‘y is a necessary condition for the possibility of x’ over ‘y is a necessary condition of x’ in terms 
of a modal weakening of the antecedent, i.e., of x. The underlying thought would seem to be this: 
If y is a necessary condition for the mere possibility of x, then y is a fortiori a necessary condition of 
x. As the above considerations show, however, it is very unclear how to understand the resulting 
‘if-then’ statements. Consider reading (ii) of (Instance), then: 
The truth of the proposition that we have free will [is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of] the truth of the proposition that we are agents.  
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As already mentioned, the idea is to ignore surface grammar and treat the word group ‘the 
possibility of’ as qualifying the necessary-condition relation that is stated to obtain between the 
truth of <we are agents> and the truth of <we have free will> – rather than to treat it as 
expressing the modal status of the hypothesised truth of <we are agents>. This suggests the 
thought that instead of construing the envisaged additional strength of transcendental 
conditionals over regular necessary-condition statements in terms of a modal weakening of x we 
can construe it in terms of a modal strengthening of the necessary-condition relation that is stated 
to obtain between y and x. The most obvious way to substantiate this idea is to think of the 
envisaged additional strength of transcendental conditionals in terms of a necessitation of 
ordinary necessary-condition statements. This would give us the following reading of (Instance): 
(Instanceii) Necessarily, if we are agents, then we have free will. 
Generalising from (Instanceii) we can interpret (TC) in terms of the following necessitated ‘if-
then’ schema: 
(TC3) Necessarily, if p, then q. 
Relying on (TC3), (TAschematic) can be reconstrued as follows: 
(TAschematic
ii) 
1 (1) p premise 
2 (2) It is necessary that if p, then q. premise (transcendental 
conditional) 
3 (3) If it is necessary that if p, then q, then if p, then q. premise (modal 
principle) 
2, 3 (4) If p, then q. (2), (3), Modus ponens 
1, 2, 3 (5) q (1), (4), Modus ponens 
 
(TAschematic
ii) seems to get closer to adequately representing what someone who argues for <q> by 
means of a transcendental conditional rather than by means of an ordinary necessary-condition 
statement would seem to want to get at. Consider the instantiation of (TAschematic
ii) with the 
example from above.10 Line (1) introduces the premise that we are agents. Line (2) introduces the 
premise that necessarily, if we are agents, then we have free will. This expresses (at least a central 
part of) what the transcendental conditional ‘freedom of will is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of agency’ comes to – if the proposed account is correct. Line (3) is an instance of the 
uncontentious modal principle that necessity implies actuality: If it is necessary that if we are 
agents, then we have free will, then if we are agents, we have free will. At line (4), the statement 
that if we are agents, then we have free will, is inferred by Modus ponens from premises (2) and 
(3). At line (5) the conclusion that we have free will is inferred, again by Modus ponens, from 
lines (1) and (4). The conclusion is reached by means of an argument that purports to partly 
ground the claim that we have free will in a necessary-condition relation that, or so it is claimed at 
line (2), is not contingent but holds of necessity. 
I think that the preceding considerations provide at least a partial answer to the question 
concerning the difference between y’s being a necessary condition for the possibility of x and y’s 
being a necessary condition of x. One difference is that y is a necessary condition for the 
                                                                 
10 Again, what follows is meant to be an example of a TA. I do not claim that it is an example of a sound TA. 
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possibility of x only if it is necessarily the case that y is a necessary condition for x. By contrast, 
some y can be a necessary condition of some x and fail to be necessarily a necessary condition of 
x.  
The preceding considerations also suggest that it is a necessary condition for a given conditional’s 
being of the transcendental variety that it be equivalent to, or at least entail, a statement the effect 
that some y is necessarily a necessary condition for some x. This feature distinguishes 
transcendental from some non-transcendental conditionals, but by no means from all. Whatever 
else can be said to set transcendental conditionals apart from non-transcendental conditionals 
(and thus TAs from non-transcendental arguments), it will have to follow the more substantial 
approaches that have usually been taken in the literature. That is, it will have to address questions 
concerning adequate subject matters of the antecedent x (x should presumably be about some 
basic and non-optional feature of our human practices), the epistemic and dialectical status of x 
(ideally, x should be in some sense epistemically evident, uncontentious or not rationally 
deniable), the kind of modality involved (presumably, it should be logical, logico-conceptual or 
metaphysical) and not least the precise nature of the consequence relation that each 
transcendental conditional states to hold of necessity between some antecedent x and some 
consequent y (presumably, transcendental conditionals should not be interpreted in terms of 
necessary material implication).11 
 
3. Ambitious and modest transcendental arguments to moral conclusions 
Much philosophical work that has either been carried out under the express title of 
‘transcendental reasoning/argumentation’ or can reasonably be taken to fall under that 
description is driven by variations on two closely related but nonetheless distinct lines of thought. 
The first line of thought reflects our performative self-understanding as agents and participants in 
purposeful (collaborative) practices:  
Some of the practices we engage in put us in epistemic contact with the world and enable 
us to achieve knowledge of, or at least justified belief concerning, some of its aspects. 
Other practices put us in instrumental contact with the world, enabling us to operate on 
some of its aspects so as to shape them according to how we want or desire (those aspects 
of) the world to be. Some put us in communicative contact with each other, facilitating 
coordinated and collaborative action, the sharing of arguments, knowledge and 
information, the communication of emotions etc. By reflection we can come to know that, 
necessarily, if we engage in those practices and attain those achievements, then it is true 
that q. Given that we do engage in those practices and attain those achievements, it is (must 
be) true that q.  
The second line of thought expresses a more cautious or modest take on what we are, do and 
achieve. It can be stated as an epistemologically reflected and attenuated version of the first one:  
We engage in practices that, we take it, enable us to achieve various goals. By reflection we 
can come to know that we cannot make rational sense of our taking ourselves to engage in 
those practices, and of our taking them to enable those achievements, unless we take it to 
be true that q. In other words: We cannot develop and/or maintain a rational self-
                                                                 
11 Reading transcendental conditionals in terms of strict (or necessary material) implication would commit one to the 
claim that every necessary truth is a condition for the possibility of the truth of any proposition whatsoever. 
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understanding as participants in those practices unless we take it to be true that q. At the 
same time, engaging in those practices seems non-optional, inevitable, indispensable for us 
– or, as Habermas (1993, p. 163) puts it, without “functional equivalent in our form of 
life”. Therefore, we have no choice but to take it to be true that q.  
The distinction between ambitious and modest TAs developed in the course of the debates 
provoked by Barry Stroud’s 1968 paper “Transcendental Arguments”12 is, roughly, the distinction 
between TAs that instantiate the first, and TAs that instantiate the second of these two lines of 
thought. It is best illustrated by way of an example. Imagine a philosopher who wants to provide 
a TA in support of the statement that every event has a cause. An ambitious TA with regard to 
that statement would be a TA that has <every event has a cause> as its conclusion. A modest 
TA, by contrast, would here be a TA to the conclusion that it is in some sense inevitable, 
indispensable or unavoidable for us to believe <every event has a cause>.  
It should be uncontentious that there is a significant difference between an argument A to the 
conclusion that q, and an argument A* to the conclusion that it is inevitable (indispensable, 
unavoidable) for us to believe <q>, quite independently of whether A and A* are TAs or not. A 
and A*’s conclusions differ, and that suffices for them to be distinct arguments. The more 
interesting point is that Stroud (1968, 1994, 1999) claims to establish that transcendental 
reasoning is viable, if at all, only insofar as it contents itself with modest TAs. All that one can 
reasonably hope to reach by means of TAs, according to Stroud, are conclusions to the effect 
that if we cannot but believe <p>, then it is inevitable for us to believe <q>. Of course, given a 
premise to the effect that we cannot but believe <p>, we can then infer that it is inevitable for us 
to believe <q>. But the inference from conclusions of the latter kind to <q> itself is blocked by 
the “simple logical observation that something’s being so does not follow from its being thought 
or believed to be so” (Stroud 1994, p. 241) – not even from its being inevitably thought or 
believed to be so.  
Stroud develops the distinction between ambitiousness and modesty, as well as his thesis that 
only modest TAs are viable, in the context of a discussion of epistemological scepticism. Leaving 
their merits in that context to one side, later on in this section I will sketch a line of thought that 
suggests that both the thesis and – in a sense – the distinction may be resisted when what is at 
issue are moral TAs from performative inconsistency. Before doing so, however, a closer look at 
the distinction between modesty and ambitiousness with regard to moral TAs is in order. 
Does the distinction between ambitiousness and modesty sort moral TAs into two types? At first 
glance, this question would seem to have a straightforward affirmative answer. Consider the 
statement that humanity is morally valuable. A moral TA of the ambitious variety would here be a 
TA to the conclusion that humanity is morally valuable. A moral TA of the modest variety, by 
contrast, would here seem to be a TA to the conclusion that the belief that humanity is morally 
valuable is in some sense inevitable, indispensable or unavoidable for us.  
However, the second part of this answer, which concerns modesty, is problematic. The problem 
generalises in that it casts doubt not just on the feasibility of modest moral TAs, i.e., of modest 
TAs to moral conclusions, but much more generally on the idea of TAs whose conclusions do 
more than just state that we are constrained to believe this or that proposition. With regard to the 
idea of modest moral TAs the problem is this: No statement expressed by an instance of ‘it is 
                                                                 
12 Some important contributions to the discussion of ambitiousness and modesty are Brueckner 1996, Hookway 
1999, Stern 2007, Stroud 1994, Stroud 1999. 
10 
 
inevitable for us to believe that p’, is a moral statement – regardless of whether the sentences 
substituted for ‘p’ express moral propositions or not.13 To argue for the statement that humanity 
is morally valuable is to argue for a moral statement. To argue for the proposition that we are 
constrained to believe that humanity is morally valuable, by contrast, is to argue for a proposition 
that concerns our doxastic options – or rather, our lack of doxastic options – with regard to a moral 
proposition. If no statement expressed by an instance of ‘it is inevitable for us to believe that p’ is 
a moral statement, however, the distinction between ambitiousness and modesty does not divide 
the domain of moral TAs into two groups at all. It rather forces us to say that if any good TAs to 
moral conclusions are to be had, they are of the ambitious variety. And someone who follows 
Stroud in claiming that, generally, only modest TAs are viable will have to deny that there are any 
good moral TAs to be had. 
It is perhaps helpful to redescribe the situation in the following way. We set out to construct a 
TA in support of the proposition that q, expressed by the sentence ‘q’, but – if Stroud’s thesis is 
correct – we end up with an argument whose conclusion firmly embeds ‘q’ within the scope of 
the doxastic-predicament operator ‘it is inevitable for us to believe that...’. It is apt to use the 
expression ‘doxastic predicament’ here because for all that a modest TA tells us it might be 
inevitable or indispensable for us to believe that q even if <q> is false. As long as we do not find 
a means to evacuate ‘q’ from the scope of the doxastic-predicament operator, we are stuck with a 
result that concerns the proposition we set out to argue for only insofar as it states that we have 
no choice but to treat it as true. Stroud (1994, p. 234) thinks that the prospects for finding such 
an argumentative evacuation measure look dim at best. However, independently of whether 
Stroud is right in the case of statements of the form ‘it is inevitable for us to believe that p’ or 
similar doxastic-predicament statements, there might be a way out of this putative impasse with 
regard to statements of the form ‘it is performatively inconsistent to try to deny that p’, at least 
where ‘p’ expresses a moral proposition. In the remainder of this section I try to indicate the way 
out. 
To try to deny <p> is to try to assert the contradictory of <p>, and to deny <p> is to assert the 
contradictory of <p>. Denials are assertions, and attempts at denying are attempts at asserting. 
What, then, does it mean to say of an assertion attempt that it is performatively inconsistent? The 
standard response appeals to speech-act theory. Roughly, assertion attempts consist of an 
illocutionary component, expressible by the performative verb ‘assert’ in the first person singular 
present indicative, and a declarative sentence that expresses a proposition. The illocutionary 
component indicates the communicative mode in which the speaker intends the propositional 
content of her speech-act attempt to be understood and, accordingly, the kind of speech act that 
she (provided she is being sincere) intends her utterance to be – in our case she intends it to be 
an assertion. To say of an assertion attempt v, made by a speaker S, that it is performatively 
inconsistent is to say that the propositional content of v is – in a sense to be specified below – 
inconsistent with the illocutionary component of v. The idea is that if v is performatively 
inconsistent, then S’s communicative intention in performing v remains unfulfilled. To say the 
same thing from the point of view of the addressees of v: If v is performatively inconsistent, then 
it is a mistake to take v in the way in which S intends it to be taken, to wit as an assertion. 
                                                                 
13 Moral statements may here be thought of as propositions to the effect that some person (or all persons) morally 
ought to (or not to) act in some specified way; or as statements to the effect that it is morally permissible to act in 
some specified way; or as statements to the effect that some action or person or character trait is morally good or 
bad, valuable or valueless, right or wrong, virtuous or vicious. 
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Performatively inconsistent assertion attempts are unsuccessful assertion attempts in the sense 
that they do not result in assertions. If v is performatively inconsistent, then the statement that v 
is an assertion is false.14 Note that, in the intended sense of ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’, a 
successful assertion attempt may have a false propositional content and an unsuccessful assertion 
attempt may have a true one. 
The vague gesture towards an inconsistency between the propositional content and the 
illocutionary component of v can be made more precise as follows: To say that a given attempt v, 
made by a speaker S, to assert that p, is performatively inconsistent is to say that the propositional 
content of v (<p>) contradicts – or entails a proposition that contradicts – at least one of the 
performative presuppositions of v. The performative presuppositions of S’s assertion attempt v 
comprise all, and only, those propositions that are logico-conceptually entailed (lc-entailed) by <S 
asserts that p>, i.e., all lc-entailments of <S asserts that p>.15 Among the lc-entailments of <S 
asserts that p> a distinction can be drawn between propositions that are lc-entailed by <someone 
asserts something> (thus a fortiori by <S asserts that p>) and propositions that, while not lc-
entailed by <someone asserts something>, are nonetheless lc-entailed by <S asserts that p>. Call 
the latter propositions ‘local’ and the former ‘global performative presuppositions’ of S’s 
assertion attempt v. We can then distinguish between the following two kinds of performative 
inconsistency: An attempt to assert <p> results in a global performative inconsistency iff <p> is 
logically inconsistent with at least one lc-entailment of <someone asserts something>. An 
attempt to assert <p>, made by the speaker S, results in a local performative inconsistency iff <p> 
is logically consistent with all lc-entailments of <someone asserts something> but logically 
inconsistent with at least one lc-entailment of <S asserts <p>>.16  
If it is correct to say that an assertion attempt which leads to a local or a global performative 
inconsistency is unsuccessful in that it fails to result in an assertion, then global performative 
inconsistencies can be taken to indicate unassertability: <p> is globally unassertable iff any 
speaker’s attempt to assert it would be performatively inconsistent, and <p> is locally 
unassertable iff some (but not any) speaker’s attempt to assert it would be performatively 
inconsistent. In what follows, local performative inconsistency and unassertability will be 
irrelevant. Henceforth, I use ‘performative inconsistency’ and ‘unassertablity’ as shorthand for 
‘global performative inconsistency’ and ‘global unassertablity’, respectively. 
Assume that the present account of performative inconsistency is on the right track and assume, 
moreover, that we have been provided with a convincing argument R to the conclusion that a 
given attempt v, made by the speaker S, to deny <p> is performatively inconsistent. R would then 
entitle us to claim that the contradictory of <p> is unassertable. But what, if anything, would R 
entitle us to say with regard to the truth value of <p>? Instances of ‘it is performatively 
                                                                 
14 It is therefore better to avoid talk of performatively inconsistent assertions. This explains the cumbersome 
formulations in terms of assertion attempts. 
15 <q> is logico-conceptually entailed by <p> iff <q> is either logically entailed by <p> or there is a conceptual truth 
t such that <q> is logically entailed by <p & t>. Note that unless <p> is itself a performative presupposition of S’s 
attempt to assert <p>, the lc-entailments of <p> are not among the performative presuppositions of S’s assertion 
attempt. 
16 The account of performative inconsistency suggested here is, prima facie at least, very different from the one 
proposed by the most persistent advocate of arguments from performative inconsistency in ethics (and elsewhere), 
i.e., by Karl-Otto Apel (cf. Apel 2001). However, I think that the present proposal is what Apel’s account comes to 
when it is made precise enough to assess. For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between global and local 




inconsistent to deny that p’ and of ‘the contradictory of <p> is unassertable’ closely resemble 
instances of ‘it is inevitable to believe that p’. The latter express statements to the effect that we 
are in a doxastic predicament with respect to <p> – we cannot not believe <p>. The former 
express statements to the effect that we are in a dialogical or discursive predicament with respect 
to <p> – we cannot deny <p>. Unless we are given an additional argument to the conclusion 
that the truth conditions of <p> are among the truth conditions of <<not-p> is unassertable> – 
and thus of <it is performatively inconsistent to deny <p>> – R does not entitle us to say 
anything at all concerning the truth value of <p>.  
A straightforward way to evacuate ‘p’ – and thus <p> – from the scope of the dialogical-
predicament operator ‘it is performatively inconsistent to deny that...’ would consist in making a 
case for the claim that the operator in question is factive (truth-entailing). If the present account 
of performative inconsistency is correct, instances of ‘it is performatively inconsistent to deny 
that p’ entail corresponding instances of ‘<not-p> is unassertable’. One way to show that the 
operator ‘it is performatively inconsistent to deny that...’ is factive would therefore consist in 
making a case for the claim that truth is constrained by assertability. Whilst assertability is 
unacceptable as a general constraint on truth (cf. Rähme 2010, ch. 5), it can, perhaps, be shown 
to constrain truth in the restricted case of moral statements. 
To say that moral truth is constrained by assertability, or that moral truth is assertorically 
constrained, is to say that, as far as moral statements are concerned, assertability is a necessary 
condition for truth:  
(ACmoral) If p, then it is assertable that p (where admissible substituents for ‘p’ are sentences 
that express moral propositions).  
The notion of assertability employed in (ACmoral) is weaker than the notion of justified assertability 
familiar from some epistemic accounts of truth and from assertability-condition semantics. If a 
statement fails to be assertable, then it fails a fortiori to be justifiedly assertable. By contrast, a 
statement can fail to be justifiedly assertable and nonetheless be assertable. With regard to the 
question of whether (ACmoral) is true, all I can offer here is an appeal to the plausibility of 
(ACmoral), or rather an appeal to the fact that (ACmoral) does at least not seem to be a wildly 
implausible constraint on moral truth. After all, moral statements are intrinsically related to the 
idea of guiding our own behaviour and assessing the legitimacy of the actions others. Statements 
that cannot even be asserted (claimed to be true), would seem ill-suited to that task. It is 
important to keep in mind here that (ACmoral) is restricted to moral statements. Accepting it does 
not commit one to the – some would say provably false – claim that all true propositions are 
assertable. Accepting (ACmoral) only commits one to the claim that there are no true moral 
statements that are unassertable. 
Much more would have to be said, but let me venture the claim that the following argument 
schema, in which the range of admissible substitutents for ‘p’ is restricted to sentences that 
express moral propositions, captures the gist of moral arguments from performative 
inconsistency: 
(Argument)17 
1 (1) It is performatively inconsistent to try to assert premise 
                                                                 
17 Recall that ‘performative inconsistency’ is to be read as ‘global performative inconsistency’. Cf. Rähme 2016 for a 




2 (2) If it is performatively inconsistent to try to assert 
that not-p, then it is not assertable that not-p. 
premise  
3 (3) If not-p, then it is assertable that not-p. premise, (substitution 
instance of (ACmoral)) 
1, 2 (4) It is not assertable that not-p. 1, 2, Modus ponens  
1, 2, 3 (5) Not-not-p. (3), (4), Modus tollens 
1, 2, 3 (6) p (5), Duplex negation 
affirmat 
 
What remains to be explained is in what sense (Argument) can be considered a schematic TA. 
Consider the schematic premise (1). According to the account of performative inconsistency 
sketched above, an assertion attempt v is (globally) performatively inconsistent iff the 
propositional content of v contradicts (or entails a statement that contradicts) a proposition lc-
entailed by <someone asserts something>. This can be restated as follows: An attempt to deny 
<p> is (globally) performatively inconsistent iff it is lc-necessary that if someone asserts 
something, then p. Given the account of transcendental conditionals and TAs sketched in section 
2, this allows for the claim that (1) entails a transcendental conditional and thus for the claim that 
(Argument) is a schematic TA. Of course, even accepting both the present account of 
transcendental conditionals and the present account of performative inconsistency does not yet 
commit one to claiming that (Argument) is a schematic TA. But it is at least quite plausible to 
hold that global performative inconsistency and global unassertability occur where speakers 
attempt to assert the contradictories of statements that express necessary conditions for the 
possibility of the truth of <someone asserts something>.18 If this is accepted, then (Argument) 
can be recast in a way that slightly expands on (TAschematic
ii): 
(Argument*) 
1 (1) Someone asserts something. premise 
2 (2) It is performatively inconsistent to assert that not-
p. 
premise  
3 (3) If it is performatively inconsistent to assert that 
not-p, then [necessarily, if someone asserts 
something, then p]. 
premise (account of 
global performative 
inconsistency) 
2, 3 (4) Necessarily, if someone asserts something, then p. (2), (3), Modus ponens 
2, 3 (5) If someone asserts something, then p. (4), necessity entails 
actuality 
1, 2, 3 (6) p (1), (5), Modus ponens 
 
A corollary of the preceding considerations is that if moral truth is assertorically constrained, then 
the distinction between modesty and ambitiousness becomes uninteresting with regard to moral 
TAs from performative inconsistency. If moral truth is assertorically constrained, then – where 
                                                                 
18 This is how arguments from performative inconsistency are interpreted in Apel’s transcendental-pragmatic version 
of discourse ethics (cf. Apel 2001). 
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<p> is a moral statement – any modest TA to the conclusion that it is performatively 
inconsistent to deny that p is convertible into an ambitious TA to the conclusion that p. 
 
4. Conclusion 
I have not mentioned moral scepticism at all. That may seem odd for a discussion of moral TAs 
from performative inconsistency. The reason for the omission is this. Substantial philosophical 
commitments are unavoidable in spelling out the idea of moral (transcendental) arguments from 
performative inconsistency, and such commitments are not scepticism-resistant. The present 
account of moral TAs from performative inconsistency is therefore useless for someone who 
wants to refute – or even just find a justification for ignoring – the moral sceptic. I submit that 
the same holds for any account of performative inconsistency that is capable of justifying the 
claim that the inference from <it is performatively inconsistent to deny that p> to <p> is, under 
certain conditions at least, legitimate. Any such account will have to involve substantial 
theoretical commitments. 
Of course, the main advocates of arguments from performative inconsistency in ethics, Karl -
Otto Apel and those who work out the details of Apel’s transcendental-pragmatic version of 
discourse ethics, often write as if merely pointing to a (putative) performative inconsistency in a 
given assertion attempt v were sufficient for epistemically establishing the contradictory of the 
propositional content of v. But the distinction between modest and ambitious TAs gives good 
reason to pause. At any rate, the price of denying (or ignoring) that the step from <it is 
performatively inconsistent to deny that p> to <p> stands in need of independent justification is 
high. It amounts to leaving the presumed epistemic relevance of performative inconsistencies 
unexplained.  
What is problematic about moral arguments from performative inconsistency is not so much that 
it is hard to see how they could be made to work. If global performative inconsistency reliably 
indicates global unassertability and if, furthermore, assertability is a necessary condition for moral 
truth, then at least in the domain of moral discourse there is a perfectly legitimate way to get from 
<it is performatively inconsistent to deny that p> to <p>. What is problematic about the idea of 
moral arguments from performative inconsistency is, rather, that it is not clear whether there are 
any moral statements whose denial results in a global performative inconsistency. Put in terms of 
transcendental conditionals, it is not clear whether there are any necessary moral conditions for 
the possibility of the practice of assertion. My dummy example was <humanity is morally 
valuable>. It would be surprising, to say the least, to find out that <humanity is morally 
valuable> is lc-entailed by <someone asserts something>. I used <humanity is morally valuable> 
as an example of a moral statement because it is expressible in four words. Ultimately, moral TAs 
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